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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Divorce-Enforcement of Consent Judgment for Payment in Lieu
of Alimony by Contempt Proceeding-Imprisonment four Debt
H instituted action against W for divorce from bed and board. No
pleadings were filed, but a consent judgment was entered which provided
inter alia that H and W should live separate and apart and that H should
pay to W, "in lieu of alimony, or other marital rights or obligations,"
regular monthly installments of money until a named total had been paid.
The judgment further provided that H should pay additional monthly
installments in stated amounts to a third person as trustee, the purpose
of these payments being to liquidate the principal of an obligation due
by H and W and secured by a deed of trust upon the home of W. The
preamble to the judgment recited that W had advanced certain moneys
to H which he used in his business and recognized his obligation to
repay. The following provision was inserted in the order: "The money
payments provided herein shall be more than a simple judgment for debt.
They shall be as effectively binding upon the plaintiff [H] as if rendered
under and by virtue of the authority of Section 1667, Consolidated
Statutes of North Carolina, and the failure of the plaintiff [H] to make
the payments ... shall ... subject him to such-penalties as may be re-
quired by the court, in case of contempt of its orders." H, after having
made some of the payments, refused to comply further with the terms of
the judgment, and was committed to jail for contempt. The North
Carolina Supreme Court, two judges dissenting, upheld the commitment
on appeal.'
This note will deal with the propriety of enforcing the judgment in
the instant case by contempt proceedings.
2*
1 Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N. C. 181, 22 S. E. (2d) 576 (1942).
2* Three other problems were dealt with in the case:
(1) It appeared that the judgment was signed by the resident judge out of the
county and out of the district in which the case was pending at a time when, by
the law of rotation, he was holding the courts of another district. The court de-
cided that under the authority of N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§1436, 1438,
598 the judge could properly sign the order under such circumstances.
(2) Since the judgment was entered by consent with no pleadings ever having
been filed, there was never any allegation that H was at fault. In the absence of
such an allegation, H questioned the validity of the order for him to pay money.
The court held that since the order was entered by consent, a judgment might be
entered as to any matter of which the court had general jurisdiction, without
regard to pleadings, citing Keen v. Parker, 217 N. C. 378, 8 S. E. (2d) 209 (1940);
Holloway v. City of Durham, 176 N. C. 550, 97 S. E. 486 (1918).
(3) The citation for contempt was heard by a special judge. The record seemed
to indicate that the hearing might have been held after the term of court for which
the special judge had been commissioned had expired. In the absence of exception
or assignment of error based upon contrary showing, the majority of the court
did not go into the matter. Devin, J., however, wrote a dissenting opinion saying
that the court should, ex inero motu, make investigations to determine whether or
not the special judge had authority to hear the citation at the time. Seawell, J.,
concurred in this dissent. Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N. C. 181, 188, 22 S. E.
(2d) 576, 581 (1942).
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It is unquestioned that a judgment for alimony may be enforced in
North Carolina by contempt,8 and this is true although the judgment is
entered by consent.4 All jurisdictions in the United States, except Mis-
souri, 5 hold that imprisonment for willful refusal to pay alimony does
not violate the constitutional provisions forbidding imprisonment for
debt.6 The problem presented in the principal case is to determine
whether the judgment was in reality a judgment for alimony or whether
it was merely an order to pay a debt. If it was the latter, H could not
be constitutionally imprisoned for failure to make the payments.7
Justice Seawell, in his dissenting opinion,8 argued that the judgment
was for the payment of a debt rather than for'alimony. This appears to
the writer to be the most logical interpretation of the facts and the judg-
ment. The majority opinion proceeds upon the assumption that the
agreement was made and the judgment entered solely in contemplation
of providing subsistence for W. This, argues the majority, makes the
judgment one, in effect, for alimony; and, since the parties plainly con-
sented that the judgment should have the same force and effect as if it
had been rendered under the authority of the statute providing for ali-
mony without divorce,9* subjects H to citation for contempt upon will-
ful failure to pay. To bring the payments to be made to the trustee in
order to release the encumbrance on W's house within their line of rea-
soning, the court said that a house in which to live reasonably came
within the meaning of subsistence.
If it had been true that the parties entered into the consent judgment
for the sole purpose of securing means of subsistence to the wife, one
could hardly take issue with the conclusiQn. But the judgment plainly
recited that the payments were to be made "in liei of alimony, or other
narital rights or obligations."'0 This expressly excludes alimony; it
emphasizes the idea that H is agreeing to make the payments, not be-
cause he recognizes that the marriage relation has imposed upon him a
duty to do so, but for some other reason. He probably would not have
consented to a decree for alimony as such, for, being the plaintiff in the
'Little v. Little, 203 N. C. 694, 166 S. E. 809 (1932) ; Pain v. Pain, 80 N. C. 322
(1879).
'Dyer v. Dyer, 212 N. C. 620, 194 S. E. 278 (1937).
Harrington v. Harrington, 233 Mo. App. 390, 121 S. W. (2d) 291 (1938);
Coughlin v. Ehlert, 39 Mo. 285 (1866).
'2 ScEOULER, MARRIAGE, DIvoRCE, SEPARATION AND DoMEsTIc RELATIONS (6th
ed. 1921) §1835.
" N. C. CoNsT. Art. I, §16.8 Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N. C. 181, 192, 22 S. E. (2d) 576, 384 (1942).
* N. C. ConE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1667, providing that if any husband shall
separate himself from his wife and fail to provide her and the children of the
marriage with necessary subsistence according to his means and condition in life,
or if he shall be a drunkard or a spendthrift, or be guilty of any misconduct or
acts that would constitute cause for divorce, either absolute or from bdd and board,
the wife may institute an action for alimony without divorce.'0 Italics supplied.
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action for divorce from bed and board, he probably did not consider
himself the party at fault.
Why, then, did H agree to make the payments? Evidently they were
intended at least partly to satisfy the debt, referred to in the preamble
to the judgment, which H owed to W. If H and W did not intend that
this judgment should discharge the indebtedness, the obligation remains
unsatisfied, and W can maintain a contract action against H. Unless
they intended that the debt should be discharged by the agreement on the
part of H to make the payments stipulated in the judgment, there was no
reason at all for referring to this debt in the preamble. The court failed
to mention the reference to the debt at all, and has held, by implication
from -its holding that no debt withiii the constitutional prohibition was
satisfied by the judgment, that the debt is still owed by H to W. This
was plainly not in accord with the intent of the parties. A well-reasoned
Michigan case held that an award of money which was partly for alimony
and partly for other purposes could not be enforced by contempt where
the amount to be paid as alimony was not plainly separated from the
other money payments provided in the award. 1 Thus, since at least
part of the payments agreed to by H were intended to discharge the debt,
the judgment should not have been enforced by contempt.
Justice Seawell called attention to another defect in the court's
analysis of the problem. 12 The statute under which the parties agreed
that H might be punished for contempt has been held to apply only to
independent suits for alimony.' 8 The instant proceeding was begun as
an action for divorce from bed and board. Therefore, if the judgment
were in reality one for alimony, it could not have been awarded under
that statute in such a proceeding. Nor could alimony be awarded under
the statute allowing alimony to the wife upon a decree of divorce from
bed and board, 14 since there was no divorce to which such alimony is
incident.
The Supreme Court of Arizona held that a court could not enforce
by contempt a judgment ordering a husband to make payments to a
third person in order to pay off a mortgage on the house in which the
wife was to liVe, since alimony consists of payments to be made to the
wife and not to a third person.'6 These payments were of the same
nature as those to be made by H in the principal case. Since the obliga-
tion secured by the deed of trust upon W's home was due by both H and
11Sturgis v. Sturgis, 300 Mich. 438, 2 N. W. (2d) 454 (1942).
1Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N. C. 181, 192, 22 S. E. (2d) 576, 584 (1942).
"Shore v. Shore, 220 N. C. 802, 18 S. E. (2d) 353 (1942) ; Silver v. Silver,
220 N. C. 191, 16 S. E. (2d) 834 (1941) ; Dawvson v. Dawson, 211 N. C. 453, 190
S. E. 749 (1937).
"N. C. CoDE AxN. (Michie, 1939) §1665.
Collins v. Superior Court In and For Maricopa County, 48 Ariz. 381, 62 P.
(2d) 131 (1936).
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W, it would seem that the provision for these payments was inserted in
the judgment at least partly with the idea of having H pay off the part
of the debt due by W. When considered in this light, it becomes plain
that this provision was also one for the payment of debt, although it
may, as the court suggested, have also contemplated providing the wife
with a house in which to live.
It is submitted that the court erred in upholding the citation for con-
tempt. Although H consented that failure to pay might subject him to
contempt proceedings under the statute relating to alimony without
divorce, his consent could not give a court jurisdiction to imprison him
for debt. He might just as well, as Justice Seawell suggests, "have
agreed that a default in the payment of the debt should subject him to
punishment under any criminal statute which may be found in the
books."16  JOEL DENTON.
Liability of Sureties-Extent to Which Liability Established Against
Principal Determines the Liability of Surety
Action by creditor against both principal and surety. The principal
had made a statement admitting liability but such statement was made
after default and without the principal knowing of his rights. Held:
The surety has the right to stand on his contract and the statement of
the principal is not binding on the surety.1
Assuming that the surety has no defenses of his own the extent to
which he may use defenses of the debtor is extremely limited. Ordinarily
any defense, not personal to the debtor, is available to the surety in an
action on the surety bond2 but some cases seem to hold that a surety
cannot make use of a defense (of the debtor) which the principal waives
or otherwise precludes himself from making 5 While this doctrine does
not apply to cases involving fraud or collusion between debtor and
creditor, 4 it does seem to extend the liability of the surety, for if a
'o Seawell, J., dissenting in Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N. C. 181, 192, 22
S. E. (2d) 576, 584 (1942), cited supra note 1.
Chozen Confections, Inc. v. Johnson, 221 N. C. 224, 19 S. E. (2d) 866 (1942).
'The Peoples Bank v. Loven, 17,2 N. C. 666, 90 S. E. 948 (1916) ; United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Town of Dothan, 174 Ala. 480, 56 So. 953 (1911);
Bear v. Duval Lumber Co., 112 Fla. 240, 150 So. 614 (1933); Greenwood v.
Greenwood, 44 Ga. App. 848, 163 S. E. 318 (1932); Benson v. Alleman, 220 Iowa
731, 263 N. W. 305 (1935); Iowa Bonding & Casualty Co. v. Wagner Co., 203
Iowa 179, 210 N. W. 775 (1926); City National Bank of Columbus, Ohio v.
Jordan, 139 Iowa 499, 117 N. W. 758 (1908) ; State v. Duggan, 102 W. Va. 312,
135 S. E. 270 (1926).
'Burwell v. First National Bank, 86 Ind. App. 581, 159 N. E. 15 (1928);
Union State Bank v. A7herican Surety Co., 324 Mo. 438, 23 S. W. (2d) 1038
(1930); M. S. Cohn Gravel Co. v. Southern Surety Co., 129 Okla. 171, 264 Pac.
206 (1928) ; Rathgaber v. Horton, 52 S. D. 436, 218 N. W. 148 (1928).
'City National Bank of Columbus, Ohio v. Jordan, 139 Iowa 499, 117 N. W.
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